What’s Lost in Translation? Discrepancies in Official Translations of China’s Foreign Policy Statements

Access to China for researchers has become more difficult in recent years. The Chinese government’s ‘zero-COVID’ policy and associated travel restrictions hinder them from conducting fieldwork on the mainland. Even before the pandemic, the tightening of ideological controls spurred concerns for researchers’ safety and the safety of those they interact with. For similar reasons, many foreign correspondents have left the country. These developments present greater limits on the collection of information about Chinese politics on the ground. Not only that, but direct conversations with Chinese counterparts have also become more difficult for government officials due to increasing competition between the United States and China. As a result, foreign researchers, journalists, and government officials increasingly rely on official statements issued by the Chinese government to discern their intentions, objectives, and behavior.

For most foreign policy statements it issues, the Chinese central government provides official English translations. While the original Chinese-language versions target a domestic audience, the English-language translations target international audiences. As a result, versions of each document may differ significantly. If observers of Chinese foreign policy are unattuned to these differences, they risk misjudging the Chinese government’s intentions. Hence, anybody trying to gauge the Chinese government’s intentions from its official foreign policy statements should be aware of discrepancies between the English and Chinese versions. Despite this fact, “Western”/non-Chinese IR researchers rely heavily on China’s foreign policy statements as their primary sources, but there is hardly any reflection on possible differences between the Chinese statements and their official English translation, let alone engagement with the potential implications of making inferences from these statements.

In the Chinese context, translations are inherently political. Differences between the two versions of a document are hardly surprising. In the Chinese academic journal Zhongguo Fanyi (中国翻译), Wang Naosheng, a translator for China’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs, explains that fidelity is the basic requirement for translators and that every word has been thoroughly and repeatedly weighed before it is finalized. Furthermore, civil servants working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Department of Translation and Interpretation translate China’s foreign policy statements. They are graduates from China’s top universities who have undergone a strict selection process and are usually members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In my recent article for a peer-reviewed journal, Foreign Policy Analysis, I report critical differences between Chinese foreign policy statements and their official English translations for a wide range of official Chinese foreign policy statements. To do so, I systematically compared selected passages on the Chinese government’s world view, foreign policy goals, and means from 91 Chinese speeches and policy documents issued between 2013 and 2019. I distinguish three types of differences. First, I identify minor differences, which represent semantic differences that do not alter the meaning of the statement. Second, differences in degree convey essentially the same meaning but to a different extent. Third, substantive differences express significant differences in meaning. I examined how frequently discrepancies appear in the document and the prevalence of each of each difference is. I also analyze patterns based on document types and whether there are changes over time. Finally, for the differences in degree and the substantive differences, I describe what exactly is different in Chinese foreign policy statements and their official English translations.

Key Differences in Translation

More than half of the analyzed foreign policy statements contain differences between the Chinese original and the official English translation. The majority of these differences are either substantive differences or differences in degree. Almost half of all foreign policy statements contain at least one difference in degree or one substantive difference. In some types of foreign policy statements, there are more differences than in others. On one hand, all reports to the CCP’s Party Congress, the most authoritative document in the Chinese system, contain differences, mostly differences in degree. On the other hand, most domestic speeches by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and the Foreign Ministers and the policy papers do not contain any differences.

There are differences in how prevalent minor, substantive, and differences in degree are based on document type and policy-making level. While substantive and minor differences are equally distributed across all document types, there is significant variation in how prominently differences in degree appear in the different document types. For example, the reports to China’s party congress feature three differences in degree on average per document. On the other end of the spectrum, Xi Jinping’s domestic speeches do not contain any differences in degree. In the other documents, this type of difference appears once every two documents.

There are differences in how prevalent minor, substantive, and differences in degree are based on document type and policy-making level. While substantive and minor differences are equally distributed across all document types, there is significant variation in how prominently differences in degree appear in the different document types. For example, the reports to China’s party congress feature three differences in degree on average per document. On the other end of the spectrum, Xi Jinping’s domestic speeches do not contain any differences in degree. In the other documents, this type of difference appears once every two documents.

At the policy-making level, I distinguish the strategic level, which refers to the most authoritative level of policymaking and describes broad and long-term strategy, from the policy-planning level, which describes more focused communication related to an immediate policy context. At the policymaking level, there is considerable variation in how prevalent the three types of differences are. Substantive differences feature far more prominently on the strategic than on the policy-planning level. The Chinese version of Xi Jinping’s speech at the G20 summit in 2016, for example, contained a detailed description of the problems in the international environment. This description was not included in the official English translation. On the other hand, minor differences feature more prominently on the policy-planning level.

Most identified substantive differences and differences in degree alter the intentions that China signals. Overall, 91 percent of substantive differences and 68 percent of differences in degree alter the signaled intentions. The Chinese version tends to signal ambitions inconsistent with existing international norms and rules. Often, these ambitions are toned down in the English version. The Chinese version of the report to the 19^th Party Congress, for instance, describes how the Chinese government intends to accelerate the transformation of the global governance system. In the official English translation, however, the Chinese government is merely described as having encouraged the evolution of the global governance system.  This pattern applies particularly to substantive differences: In 70 percent of substantive differences, the Chinese version of the document signals more ambitions that are inconsistent with the existing norms and rules than the English version. The Chinese version of a speech Xi gave at a summit with Latin-American countries in 2015, for example, described extensively how developing countries strengthened their positions in international politics and changed the international distributions of power. These details do not appear in the English translation.

Two trends are noteworthy when examining the policy substance behind the observed differences in degree: First, the Chinese version tends to use stronger verbs when advocating for China’s initiatives, such as the transformation of the global governance system, a new type of international relations, or the establishment of a community of shared destiny. Second, the Chinese version emphasizes China’s role in the solution of global problems and, in particular, its contributions to conflict resolution.

When examining the policy substance behind the identified substantive differences, it becomes apparent that the Chinese versions tend to be more detailed. For example, in many instances, the Chinese versions contain more detailed descriptions of threats in the international environment. In other instances, the Chinese versions contain more details on Chinese proposals, name concrete areas for international cooperation, and list specific global and regional mechanisms. Lastly, the Chinese versions contain more details that indicate a slightly different emphasis. For example, at the UN General Assembly 2014, the Chinese version calls upon others to follow the “spirit of the UN Charter,” whereas the English version speaks about the UN Charter as such. 

There are also important shifts in how frequently the three types of differences appear in Chinese foreign policy statements over time. The most significant changes have occurred with regards to minor differences. Initially in 2013, there were, on average, two minor differences per document. At the end of the time frame, there were hardly any minor differences in the documents. The average amount of substantive differences per document also shifts over time, while the average amount of differences in degree remains relatively stable. Regarding substantive differences, an increase is visible until 2014, followed by a drop until 2017, before a sharp increase in 2019. Regarding differences in degree, there is a sharp drop between 2012 and 2013. Then it remains at a constantly low level before it spikes again around 2017. For minor differences, there is a sharp drop between 2012 and 2013. Finally, after hardly any changes, there was another drop between 2017 and 2018.

In sum, more than half of the analyzed foreign policy statements contain differences between the Chinese original and the official English translation. The majority of these differences are either substantive differences or differences in degree. Most of them alter the intentions that the Chinese government signals. Over time, minor differences have become less frequent, but the frequency of substantive differences have shifted significantly over time.

Why Differences Matter

Since differences between the original Chinese documents and the official English translations are so widespread and so considerable that they impact signaled intentions, observers of Chinese foreign policy need to pay close attention to these differences. It should be best practice to identify such differences by comparing the two document versions before engaging in any in-depth analysis. As my analysis shows, anyone who wants to understand the Chinese government’s intentions and only considers the English version of a document risks misjudging them.

Luckily, automatic translation tools such as Google Translate or DeepL Translator can capture most of the identified differences. I translated the official Chinese text with Google Translate and DeepL and then compared the automatic translations with the official translations provided by the Chinese government. The translation tools could pick up all differences in degree between the original Chinese text and its official English translation that I had identified. Of the substantive differences, the translation tools could pick up between 94.7 percent (Google Translate) and 97.4 percent (DeepL). There was only one substantive difference that none of the translation tools could pick up: The English version of the “China in the world” policy paper issued in 2019 described China as “a country that suffered abuse and humiliation in the past”. The Chinese version contained the same description but referred to China as a great power (大国). The automatic translations could pick up all other substantive differences I had identified. Hence, these tools can be of great use when comparing the different versions.

While being aware of these differences is important, it also raises several new questions. Most importantly, researchers should try to uncover the motivations behind the differences between foreign policy statements issued in Chinese and their official English translations. Since the phenomenon is not limited to foreign policy statements, exchanges with translation scholars, especially proponents of critical discourse analysis, with their understanding of translation as a social practice, might be a fruitful starting point. In addition, exchanges with translation practitioners might be insightful.