An Interview with Carla Freeman: U.S. and NATO Positions in Asia

How will the conflicts in the Middle East, and the Russo-Ukrainian war affect U.S. competition with China in the Indo-Pacific?

This is a very important question, but it’s really a bit early to say. The situation is still fluid, and it’s unclear how it will play out. One possibility is that the United States becomes tied down in the Middle East and is also under pressure as it attempts to continue to support Ukraine in the conflict with Russia, and thus is unable to give the Indo-Pacific the kind of attention that it has sought in order to put pressure on China and to support its allies and partners in the region. But the other possibility is that that doesn’t happen, especially as U.S. concerns about China’s role

The United States, of course, was very involved in Afghanistan for a long time and made a policy pivot to Asia, launching its Indo-Pacific framework. It may be that the United States continues its current trajectory in the Indo-Pacific, while trying to find diplomatic pathways forward in the Middle East and the Ukraine war. Meanwhile, regardless of what happens in these other arenas, the competition between the United States and China is going to be sustained in the Indo-Pacific region because there are so many different issues that the two countries disagree about. These disagreements go beyond Taiwan but involve key U.S. allies and partners that have territorial disputes with China. The United States also has its own interests, economic and in maintaining freedom of navigation and so on in the region.

But in any case, what we’re talking about is the short term. This situation is not sustainable; the costs of these conflicts in three diverse regions are extremely high for the United States not only financially and for the risk of escalation to more direct military involvement they carry but also in terms of the government attention they consume away from other critical global and domestic issues.

How would linking NATO to the Indo-Pacific affect security relations in the Indo-Pacific region?

So, this is an interesting question because NATO is already quite linked to the Indo-Pacific and has been for a very long time. There have been formal arrangements between NATO and Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand for around a decade. NATO’s role has grown in recent years, and its interests have expanded. There are new arrangements like the Indo-Pacific four (IP-4) emerging– including Australia, South Korea, Japan, and New Zealand– who have begun engaging with NATO in a more formal way in the last couple of years, including participating in the NATO heads of state summit in 2022.

So how is that affecting security relations in the region? Certainly, it adds to tensions between the US and China. But I think it’s important to say that these arrangements do not mean that there is an “Asian NATO” in the works, or that NATO itself wants a formal role in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, I think its charter limits new membership to European countries. The movement to strengthen ties between these countries and NATO were forged prior to the intensification of strategic tensions between the United States and China. Moreover, both the members of NATO and countries in the IP-4 have their own concerns and interests with respect to China.

South Korea, for example, has a very important economic relationship with China and wants to maintain that. Australia, as well, has important trade ties to China, etc. None of the IP4 want their cooperation with NATO to be seen as directed against China. But they clearly want to ensure the region’s capacity to deter China (and other threats) is strengthened. And China’s perceptions matter so it’s a gamble– it’s a strategy that could increase tensions and reduce a sense of security on China’s part so much that it leads to tensions that ultimately increase rather than reduce the risk of conflict.

How does the absence of trade agreements impact the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework? Will this undermine U.S. competitiveness in the economic sphere?

Well, the United States clearly sees a need for trade agreements in the Indo-Pacific, and that’s why it has been pursuing the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) agreement. But that’s been very difficult to negotiate, and it also lacks the kind of robust arrangements that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would have contributed to the US presence in the Indo-Pacific as a trading and investment partner. So, without a trade agreement of the TPP’s type, the United States’ ability to compete and invest competitively in the region will depend heavily on bilateral relationships.

And so, there is a risk that because those bilateral relationships are easily politicized, that could have an impact on US competitiveness in the economic sphere, particularly since other countries, including China and other major economies, have more robust trade arrangements in the Indo-Pacific. But the United States still has important ties to countries in the region. The IPEF, at least the part of IPEF that focuses more on securing production chains and so on, has been negotiated, and it is possible that this will help mitigate the lack of a TPP-style agreement for the United States in the region. But I do see competing as an uphill battle for the United States in the absence of the kind of robust agreement the TPP represented.

What do you think are the trade-offs between U.S. security interests and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region? Will the United States pay an economic price for its security interests?

The significant economic price we are paying for our security interests, of course, is the decoupling with China that the two countries have been undergoing in the last few years. This poses a major economic cost, including for US consumers and many US companies that had high stakes in the Chinese economy. However, the gamble is that by pursuing a strategy that protects US technology and also focuses more heavily on securing US interests through alliances and so on, ultimately, it will leave the United States in a stronger position over time.

This approach results in more onshoring and new industrial development and a stronger domestic economy on the US side, while the United States is simultaneously able to pursue its security arrangements in the region. However, there is also a risk that it fosters division across the region and creates multiple economic tracks, which are less efficient and reduce the prospects for a return to the kind of globalized economy that yielded so many benefits for the United States and the rest of the world. So, in a nutshell, I think the United States’ decision to emphasize its security interests over economic interests will have significant economic costs.

Will the new regional architecture that the United States is constructing in the Indo-Pacific, such as Quad and Partners in the Blue Pacific, weaken ASEAN’s centrality in the region?

This is, again, one of those questions that’s hard to answer with much certainty but I do believe there is a risk to ASEAN from the numerous new mini and multilateral arrangements emerging throughout the region. On one hand, ASEAN countries could continue to focus on strengthening ASEAN. However, these new arrangements, particularly because each of them offers certain opportunities to different countries in the region or addresses specific aspects of regional security, may draw countries towards them and away from focusing on ASEAN. This is a concern. Again, much will depend on the commitment that ASEAN member states themselves have to ASEAN, but also, much will depend on the value that the United States assigns to ASEAN.

I think there’s been a lot of frustration with ASEAN over the years on the part of US leaders because of the ASEAN way, the ASEAN process, and so on. These new multilateral arrangements are designed to solve specific problems. They may do that, and they may actually contribute to promoting US and even regional interests, but they do risk weakening ASEAN’s centrality unless the United States keeps its eye on ASEAN and maintains its own stake in seeing this very important institution thrive.

What do you think about U.S. policy toward Burma, Laos, and Cambodia? Do you think the U.S. will invest more resources in these regions in the future to compete with China for influence?

I’m not sure if these will be major focuses of U.S.-China competition, but I think where the United States can enhance its relations with these countries, it will do so. And it’s actually already happening. Burma is a particular case because of the Junta and the civil war erupting across the country. There, you’re likely going to see the United States develop more formal ties with resistance groups, especially if they appear to be making headway in the civil war toward forming a stable government. But at the moment, we have not made a commitment to doing more than providing humanitarian assistance.

As far as Laos goes, the relationship between the United States and Laos is an old and important one. I believe it was in 2016 that then U.S. President Obama visited Vientiane, and the relationship started to improve, but it remains pretty narrowly focused on war legacies. There are concerns that the United States has about China’s growing security role in the Mekong, so there, you might see the United States putting more resources into it through channels like the Mekong-U.S. Partnership to fortify U.S. diplomacy– that is really a development angle, not a security angle.

With Cambodia, I think the question is quite interesting. There are some demand signals from Cambodia that it would like to move away from China’s orbit. With a new leader, Manet, who is a West Point graduate (and of course also the son of Hun Sen), there is an opportunity for improving U.S.-Cambodia ties at a fairly low cost, I think, to the United States. However, currently, U.S. concerns about human rights and other issues with Cambodia remain impediments to strengthening that relationship.

I think these countries are important, but right now, they aren’t going to be a major site of US competition with China. If the US can improve its ties with these countries at a lower cost, I think it would be interested in exploring that.

Why does the United States support India as a regional leader? Is India willing to challenge China?

This is a fascinating area for regional dynamics because the United States, I think, has very high expectations for India in the region, and I believe support for developing U.S.-India ties comes from a couple of places. One is that India has enormous potential as an economic partner, particularly given the decoupling between the United States and China. So, if you’re looking for another major economic partner with a vast, young workforce that could produce for U.S. companies, India looks like a great potential partner. Also, India is politically easy for the United States to engage, partly because of its democratic political system. So, I think that’s a factor. The big one, though, of course, is that the United States sees India as a potential counterbalance to China and, also, because security relations with India helps extend U.S. security partnerships across the Indian Ocean.

But I think that raises a second question: Is India actually willing to challenge China? Well, we’ve seen India willing to challenge China over their territorial dispute, with the two countries even coming to blows in the past few years along their contested border. Fundamentally, if you really look closely at the India-China relationship, I think India would like to continue engaging with China, especially economically and maintain a relatively stable relationship. Additionally, although India is willing to challenge China because it does not want China to expand its footprint in the Indian Ocean, which has been India’s traditional sphere of influence, it also recognizes that it is significantly behind militarily compared to China. India alone cannot challenge China in this regard. It’s really India’s insecurity with respect to China that is driving India to turn to the United States and to collaborate with the United States on the security front.

But India has also made it very clear that it is not looking for a new Cold War. It sees the future as a multipolar one, and in this regard, I think India and China have an overlapping view among their many differences. I would say that India is willing to challenge China where China negatively affects India’s interests, but otherwise, it is seeking opportunities to stabilize the relationship so that India can continue to grow and develop, among other goals.

Following this question, do you think the decoupling between the United States and China is happening now? The Biden administration has said that the United States will not decouple with China in the near future.

I’ve used the term “decoupling” a few times just as shorthand to describe a process of disengagement between the two economies. And I think it’s actually a two-sided process; it’s not just the United States, but also China that is trying to indigenize more of its economy and reduce its vulnerabilities, especially in advanced technologies and so on. The two countries are not going to completely decouple, but there is a decoupling in parts of their economies that I think has already taken place and will continue to be sustained because of the security concerns on both sides about too much cooperation, especially in dual-use technologies and so on. Currently, that’s a process underway. How far it will go will depend on what happens in the world and how the countries pivot to address different challenges and opportunities in the future.

Is there a chance for China and the United States to rebuild strategic mutual trust in the near future? What should both sides do?

Yes– I mean, I’m always an optimist, so I believe that there’s always a chance to rebuild trust; it is not impossible. But in the near term, it would be really tough. China perceives the United States and assesses its actions as an effort to constrain China and its development, and to hamper China’s security interests. So, on the Chinese side, I think it would be very difficult for China to change its perception of the United States as a risk or threat.

On the U.S. side, I actually think it would be easier for the United States to adjust its perception. That’s odd to say, but I think if the United States felt that China was putting less pressure on U.S. allies, if there was progress on the South China Sea disputes in a way that stabilizes those to the satisfaction of U.S. allies and partners, and if there was a U.S. administration that saw it in U.S. interests to reduce tensions with China, you could see an effort by the United States to bridge the trust gap. This is particularly relevant given ongoing tensions with Russia, North Korea, and other emerging global hotspots.

But, again, in the near term I don’t think prospects for boosting bilateral trust are good. Perhaps the best thing that can happen may be that the two sides continue to engage in both high-level dialogue and military-to-military discussions so that we at least have those channels of communication open, and we start to find opportunities to work together. There have been some discussions about cooperation on global governance of artificial intelligence, and there are possibilities for the United States and China to collaborate on issues in the Middle East. If the two sides perceived risks to the global economy, that would also be an opportunity for some degree of cooperation. Additionally, if there were some kind of resolution of Russia’s actions against Ukraine, we could see some cooperation, perhaps even on rebuilding Ukraine, between the United States and China—though this seems remote as China seems committed to its comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia.